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IN THE. SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER F. ~I ORGAN, I-IAROLD T. 
MORGAN, GE·ORGE CROMAR, LESLIE 
CROMAR, WILLIAM CROMAR, 
EUGENE CR0~1:AR, and ARLENE 
CRO~!AR GEAR, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
BERT SORENSON, DICK WIND, MRS. 
BERT SORENSON, and MRS. DICK 
WIND, 
D·efend.ants and Appellants, 
-AND-
VERRUE THEOBALD, Ad1ninistrator of 
the Estate of James T. Morgan, Deceased; 
VERRUE THE·OBALD, Administrator of 
the estate of Frank A. Cromar, Deceased; 
Mrs. Frank Cromar, whose true and correct 
name is otherwise unknown; JOHN BAR-
NARD, and HAROLD EVANS., 
Cross-Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIE:B""f OF' R.ESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF· CASE 
Case No. 
8153 
This action was begun by the named plaintiffs upon 
an ordinary complaint to quiet title to the Black Jack 
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Lode Mining Claims numbered 1 to 5 inclusive, situated 
in Erickson Mining District, Juab County, Utah, against 
the named defendants. Paragraph 1 of the complaint (R. 
______ ) alleges : 
"That the plaintiffs Walter F. Morgan and 
Harold T. Morgan are the only surviving heirs at 
law of James Morgan, also known as James T. 
Morgan, deceased; and that plaintiffs George 
Cromar, Leslie Cromar, William Cromar, Eugene 
Cromar and Arlene ·Cro1nar Gear are the only sur-
viving heirs at law of F. A. Cromar, decea'Sed." 
Defendants came into court with a motion for exten-
sion of time in which to answer (R. ______ ) supported by 
an affidavit (R. ______ ) in which it is alleged: 
"That more particularly the affiant herein 
(Eldon A. Eliason) herein has been unable to find 
any record, after careful search, of the appoint-
ment of an administrator or executor in either the 
estate of James T. Morgan or F. A. Cromar, both 
deceased, and both original locators on whom the 
plaintiffs make their P'Urported claim. That there 
is no record of conveyances before death which 
would divest these individuals, their heirs or 
creditors of interest in the mining property de-
scribed in the complaint. There is no order es-
tablish heirship of either of the deceased locators." 
The order was granted, and some time after which 
the named defendants filed their Answer and Cross-
Complaint wherein they allege: (R. ------) 
"1. That Verrue Theobald is the duly ap-
pointed, qualified and acting administrator of the 
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estate of James Morgan, also known as James T. 
Morgan, deceased. 
"2. That Verrue Theobald is the duly ap-
pointed, qualified and acting administrator of the 
estate of F. A. Cromar, also known as F'rank 
Ctomar, or Frank A. Cromar, deceased." 
And in which cross-complaint defendants claim to be 
owners of the Black Queen Lode Mining Claims numbered 
1 to 5, inclusive, and Johnny Boy claim, which claims 
covered approximately the same area covered by the 
Black Jack Claims, and allege that the Black Jack Claims 
were by the plaintiffs and their grantors and locators 
abandoned and forfeited prior to the location by the de-
fendants; and that the required labor and improvements 
were not performed upon the Black Jack Claims for any 
year since 1948. (R. ______ ) And also say that Verrue 
Theobald as such administrators, are parties who have, 
or may have some right title or interest in and to said 
mining property, etc. 
Pursuant to a pre-trial a Pre-trial Order was made 
in which the premises on which the issues herein are 
stated as follows : ( R. ------) 
"4. The plaintiffs claim that said Black Jack 
locations were valid and subsisting locations at 
the time of the attempted location of said mining 
ground by the defendants, and claim tha.t assess-
ment work upon said Black Jack claims was made 
for the assessment year ending July 1, 1950. 
"5. The plaintiffs claim that the mining 
ground embraced in the mining ·claims under 
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which the defendants clailn, to wit: Black Queens 
... and Johnny Boy, was not open to location at 
the time of location by the defendants, and that 
each and all of said claims are invalid. 
"6. The defendants and cross-complainants 
claim that the plaintiffs and their predecessors 
have failed to do any assessment work upon the 
Black Jack elalins at any time since the year 1949, 
and that the ground embraced in the Black Jack 
Claims was therefore open to relocation at the 
time of defendants claims, to wit June 21, 1951." 
Upon the iS'sues arising from such premises the par-
ties went to trial, P. N. Anderson appearing for the plain-
tiffs and cross-defendants Verrue Theobald, administra-
tor of the estate of James Morgan, deceased and Verrue 
Theobald, administrator of the estate of F·rank Cromar 
deceased. (R. ______ ) Default of defendants Harold Evans 
and John Barnard was entered. (Tr. 2) 
In order to more eoncisely and clearly argue our posi-
tion we deem it ne'Cessary to make a ~tatement of facts 
and set forth substantial parts of the evidence which 
support the Findings of Facts made by the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF F'ACTS 
Walter F·. Morgan and Harold T. Morgan are sons 
of the late James Morgan or James T. Morgan and the 
named Cromars plaintiffs were the only surviving heirs 
at law of Frank Cromar. (Tr. 2-3-4) Amended locations 
for Black J'ack Claims 1 to 5 inclusive (Ex. 2 to 6) were 
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n1ade in 19·30 by Jrunes Morgan and ] 1 rank Cromar, and 
the location notices for claims 1 to 4 inclusive were pre-
pared by Arthur A. Miller, a 1nineral survey.or, and wh'ich 
depict how the claims -vvere staked and marked with 4" by 
4" corner posts. Over the course of the ensuing years the 
clai1ns were worked and held by said Morgan and Cro-
mar. One, D. H. Evans, performed work and improve-
ments under a lease (Ex. 9; Tr. 223) upon the Black Jack 
claims, which provided that he should so do. (Par. 5) 
On April 10, 1949, Jan1es 1\forgan executed and de-
livered a quit claim deed (which was not recorded until 
in 1951, Ex. 7; Tr. 2) to his aforenamed sons; but con-
tinued his efforts upon the claims until the month he 
died, November 26, 1949. On July 8th, 1949 he made as 
co-owner and had recorded a notice of intention to hold 
under the Congressional Act Public Law 107. (Ex. 8; Tr. 
222) That the plaintiffs claimed the benefit of that Act 
and to have the work and improvements made upon said 
claims between July 1, 1948 and July 1, 1949, credited 
upon and for the assessment year July 1, 1949 and JUly 
1, 1950. (Tr. 229-294-295) 
WALTER F. MORGAN testified: 
"Q. What comment was made by your father at 
the time he gave this (deed) to you~ 
A. His exact words I don't remember, but he just 
wanted us to have all of his personal holdings 
because he was getting old." 
The consideration was only one dollar. James Morgan 
died November 26, 1949. 
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0. H. EVANS, for plaintiff, testified: He had a 
lease on the Black Jack claims dated May, 1948 (Ex. 9; 
Tr. 223-224) That between July 1, 1948 and July 1, 1949, 
he did work and made improvements upon the claims, 
particularly he sank a winze at the end of the tunnel fro~ 
a depth of 20 feet to 70 feet, ap·proxirnately 50 feet. About 
$6000.00 wa:s 'spent by Evans and associates under the 
lease. (Tr. 225 to 229) He mined and shipped some com-
mercial ore; about 8 inches of high grade lead-zinc ore 
in bottom 'Of winze. Fighting vvater made for big cost in 
op,eration; it comes up from every direction; have to keep 
it pump:ted dovvn. (Tr. 230-231) Ernest P. Lancaster 
and others were employed in the work July 1948 to July 
1, 1949. (Tr. 234) The water raised about 2 feet per 
minute, 48-49 wet winter. (Tr. 242) The ground upon 
which pump·ed water is delivered is gravel and shale; 
water sinks in; no chance t'O spread out fron1 ravine; no 
mud-'Sinks right in. Water pumped from winze to level 
of tunnel and runs out through tunnel-not piped. (Tr. 
251-252). 
He and others did work on claims about July 7 to 
16th, 1949 in Tunnel on Black J'ack No. 1 (This is the 
main tunnel) Three men helped. Pumped out winze at end 
of tunnel; installed stalls, sills, and head boards to hold 
ground in case of future operations. Five days of 24 
hours for pumping and 1 day timbering between 50 feet 
and 70 feet down winze. Most of timbers were obtained 
from James Morgan, who had quite a lot. Retail price 
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would be quite high. Purchased gasoline, one check 
$98.38. Work required 36-8 hour shifts, at standard 
miners' wages of $10.85 per shift. (Tr. 225-228) 
Thirty-six 8 hour shifts at $10.85 per shift is $390.60; 
gasoline $98.38, and while we find no price on timbers 
they "\vould con1e quite high and at least $11.02; making a 
total of $500.00 within the assessment year July 1, 1949 
and July 1, 1950. (Tr. 226-228) 
ERNEST P. LANCASTER, for plaintiffs, testified: 
He worked with others for Evans between July 1, 1948 
and July 1st, 1949 on Black Jack claims, back in winze 
at end of main tunnel; water in winze, ch.ased him out 
several times in 48-49; work-sinking winze, skidding and 
tramming waste, timbering and blasting. ( Tr. 272-273) 
Around middle of July, 1949, sawed timbers for use in 
Black Jacks. (Tr. 274) lie and all went down (from the 
mines) for the 4th of July. ( Tr. 281) 
VICTOR BRAY, for plaintiffs, testified: Was ac-
quainted with James 1forgan, who died latter part of No-
vember, 1949. Knew the Black Jack claims. Went with 
Morgan on claims the first time the latter part of July, 
1949; again about 1niddle of September, and again the 
first part of November, 1949. Stayed three days each 
time. They cleaned around track and dug ditches for 
drainage for winze inside tunnel. (Tr. 253-55-57) Morgan 
was not a very well man. (Tr. 258) Water was running 
out of mouth of tunnel; it showed that there had been 
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more water than there was running out, because water 
had run over the track (in tunnel). ( Tr. 258-260) Settle-
ment for time-Morgan called it even on account owing 
him by Bray for loans, and paid Bray $30.00 ca.sh. (Tr. 
255) 
RAY SPAR, for defendant, testified: Considered 
himself a mining engineer, and had in December 1941, 
gone on the Black Jack property with James Morgan who 
. pointed out to Spar the working (tunnel) and S.par learn-
ed of the shaft and "\Vater at end of tunnel, and became 
interested in property. Went on pToperty three times 
in Dec. 1941 and Feb. 1942. (Tr. 142) The next time Spar 
went on Black J a'Cks in 1945 and then in 1949; and in in-
. terirn a new winze had been sunk, he observed on July 
3rd 1949. Morgan told him in 19-41 good ore was in tpe 
bottom-62o/o lead. He saw ore in bin. (T·r. 145-146-176) 
Morgan told me it came out of the winze. (Tr. 174) Mor-
gan pointed out markers to him and said property had 
been surveyed. (Tr. 185) The road up to tunnel was same 
July 3, 1949 as "\Vhen he first went up with Morgan, no 
change. (Tr. 147) In 1945 Morgan had ore in bin, Spar 
observed. (Tr. 149) Spar and sorenS'on had claims lo-
cated together in the Erickson Topaz District. On the 
first trip on Black Jack claims in July 1949 Sorenson 
was with him. (Tr. 174-175) Spar went again on claims 
First time in July, 1949, water was up to level of 
tunnel and running from tunnel; there was ·evidence at 
one time previous the water had been pumped out, bu! 
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how long before he could not say; could see where water 
had been running down the hill on the outside, indicating 
some activity in way of pumping prior to J'uly, 1949. (Tr. 
178-179) As of July 2 or 3, the markings which indi-
cated there probably had been an air compressor 'Set up 
beside the tunnel were such to indicate it had probably 
been within a month previous to that. (Tr. 199) July 3rd, 
194U, he and Sorenson followed the road and walked up. 
(Tr. 180) Sorenson never paid Spar for services at any 
time and owes Spar nothing. (Tr. 173) 
BERT SOR.ENSON heretofore referred to as Soren-
son, defendant, testified: First time he was on Black 
Jack claims "\Vas about July 3, 1949. (Tr.18) He with Ray 
Spar went into tunnel and at end observed a pond of 
water and ore showings. Saw other improvements on 
claims-a drift on No.5; other workings on No.4 (Tr. 
21-233-23) He saw markers 4" by 4" and piles of rock. 
(Tr. 25-26) An ore bin had been constructed and a road 
made up to the bin. (Tr. 33) He did not remember if water 
was running out of tunnel July 3, 1949. (Tr. 116) He 
could not say the road up to the tunnel site had not been 
used; it was traversible by a touring car; it could have 
been used in the past. (Tr. 123-124) 
· He went on Black Jack ground July 3, J:uly 20 and 
October 10, 1949, to either locate it or lease it. He did 
not know who had the claims; did not try to find out; and 
did not know the ground was Black Jack claims. He did 
not know ore (on ground) had any value. (Tr. 113-114) 
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And R·ay Spar was with hi1n. (Tr. 20) (See Spar's testi-
Inony in connection herewith) He knew in 1950 by whon1 
Black Jack Claims were claimed (Tr. 11-1) but did not at-
tempt to contact clain1ants. (Tr. 115) The Trinnel was 
300 feet to 400 feet in length. (Tr. 21) A cabin and the 
ore bid is near mouth of tunnel. (Tr. 107) The road goes 
up a gulch; up a ridge, turns back down through a s~ale 
and stops at cabin. (Tr. 113) Sorenson never paid Spar 
for anything; they prospected together here and there. 
(Tr. 140) 
STATE1iENT OFI POINTS 
PoiNT 1. 
The evidence is sufficient to sustain the finding that 
neither the plaintiffs or their predecess·ors abandoned 
or ceased to claim ownership of t~e Black Jack Claims 
after th~ location'S thereof. 
POINT 2. 
That the evidence is amply sufficient that there was 
at least $500.00 worth of labor and imp·rovements per-
formed upon the Black Jack claims between July 1, 1948 
and July 1, 1949, for and on account of plaintiffs and pre-
decessors in interest. 
10 
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POINT 3. 
That the evidence fully justified the finding that 
the quit-claim deed from James Morgan to his sons wa:s 
intended a.s a deed of gift and to take effect upon death 
of grantor and that James Morgan had sufficient interest 
in the claims to authorize him to effectively make and file 
the Intention to hold Mining Claims under Public Law 
107 of the 81st Congress as shown by plaintiffs' exhibit 
'8'. 
PoiNT 4. 
That plaintiffs were entitled to invoke the benefit 
under said Public Law 107 to have credit for the work 
and improvements performed between J u1y 1st, 1948 and 
July 1, 1949, applied to and for the assessment year July 
1, 1949 to July 1, 1950. 
PoiNT 5. 
That the issues involved did not require proof of the 
required assessment work subsequent to July 1, 1950. 
ARGUM·ENT 
PoiNT 1. 
The amended location notices depict 4" by 4" markers 
having been used. Spar said Morgan pointed out corners 
and said the claims had been surveyed. After 19 years 
Sorenson himself identified some of such markers. The 
fact that he could not locate more corners or monuments 
than he did is nc evidence of abandonment. 
11 
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In JUPITER MINING CO. vs. BODIE ~fiNING 
COl\IIP ANY, 4 Morrison 1Iining Rep·. ±11, 11 Fed. 666, 
one of the oldest leading cases and \vhich has been follow-
ed by many others, says: 
"After a location has been lawfully made, the 
right of the locator cannot be divested by the mere 
obliteration of the marks or monuments or re-
moval of the stakes without his fault, he having 
performed the other acts required by the Statute." 
PoiNT 2. 
Defendants' evidence as to the work and improve-
ments on the claims is principally that the witnesses did 
not see or observe any, reminding us of the ca.se of 
CHAMBERLAIN vs. M·ONTGOMERY, (Utah 1953) 261 
Pac. 2nd 942, wherein it appears that the would be claim 
jumper hired an engineer to make observations as to any 
work that might be performed upon the desired claims, 
and who reported and testified that only three days work 
had been done within the assessment year, but in which 
case it app·ears that the workmen had back filled with 
muck after their working p-eriod obstructing from the 
view of trespassers the inside working which showed a 
good vein of ore. In that case the Court said : 
" ... the trial Court's findings that the work 
was in fact done during the questioned year, 
whether or not it was easily discoverable by ap-
pellant, supports the conclusion that the respond-
ents retained their prior claim." 
In the case at bar we have the testimony of two dis-
12 
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interested witnesses (at the time of trial) who had been 
engaged in the vvork of sinking the additional 50 feet of 
winze at the end of the main tunnel on Black Jack No. 1, 
at a cost of about $6000.00, cost being high because of the 
water pumping. One tenth of that figure was sufficient, 
and then there vvas additional work done after July 1 
1949 to apply for the year July 1, 1949 to July 1, 1950, 
with the carry-over under public law 107 Act of Congress. 
The track in the tunnel evidently vvas in good shape as 
far as any proof to the contrary. The road up to the tun-
nel was traversible by a touring car. And defendants' 
witness Spar testifie·d that on July 3, 1949 there was evi-
dence that water had previously been pumped out, be-
cause he could see where water had been running down 
the hill on the outside of the tunnel, which indicated some 
activity in the way of pumping; and certainly such physi-
cal evidence must have been made after the spring thaw. 
And he also said that the markings which indicated there 
probably had been an air compressor set up beside the 
tunnel were such to indicate it had probably been within 
a month previous to that-J'uly 3, 1949. 
The burden of proof is upon the party alleging that 
the work was not done-And the proof should be clear 
and convincing. 
40 C. J. 845, page 303; 
Morrisons Mining Rights (16th Ed.) 130; and 
numerous cases. 
After reciting the evidence in CHAMBERLAIN vs. 
13 
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~IONrrGOMERY, supra, the Court said: 
"This certainly was sufficient evidence of the 
fact that the work was done and this c·ourt cannot 
pass on the credibility of the witnesses before the 
lower Court." 
That quotation certainly applies in this case with 
reference to the countenance and evasiveness of defend-
ant Sorenson when he testified that he did not know ·of the 
Black Jack claims or who the holders were July 3, 1949, 
when he went with Spar, mining engineer, who knew very 
much about the claims, and both were interested in leas-
ing or locating the claims; or when he, Sorenson wa;s 
questioned as to the condition of the road to the tunnel, 
what he observed at the end of the tunnel, and as to other 
workings on the claims which he ap·parently tried to avoid 
testifying to. (Tr. 120-122) There can not rationally be 
any doubt but \vhat Sorenson, prospecting with Spar, who 
knew about the Black Jack claims from Morgan as far 
back as 1941 where they were located and had been sur-
veyed, that there was good ore at bottom of winze, saw 
ore in bin, and told that Rome weni 62% lead, knew about 
these claims and the owners thereof, and conceived a 
bright picture ·of becoming the owner rather than lessee 
thereof. 
"As a general rule of law, forfeitures are not fav-
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In BETTS vs. STEPIIENSON, 223 Pac. 2nd 651, 
(Calif.) it is said: 
".1:\ forfeiture of a mining claim for failure to 
do the annual work can be established only upon 
clear and convincing proof of such failure. (Cit-
ing case'S) Every reasonable doubt will be re-
solved in favor of the validity of a mining claim as 
against the assertion of a forfeiture." Citing 
Thornton v. Karfman, (Mon.) 106 Pac. 361. 
In NEW MERCUR ~ING. CO. vs. SOUTH MER-
CUR MNG. CO., 102 Utah 131, 128 Pac. 2nd 269, the 
Court says: 
"Law does not favor forfeitures, and hence 
ordinarily the party claiming forfeiture of a title 
must plead and establish it by clear and convincing 
proof.'' 
The same rule prevails generally, and in LUCKY 5 
MNG. CO vs. CENTRAL IDAH·O PLACE MNG. CO. 
(Idaho) 235 Pac. 2nd 319 it i'S held: 
"If trial Courts' findings are sustained hy 
competent, substantial though conflicting evidence, 
they will not be distributed on appeal." 
To the same effect is PEASE vs. JOHNSON, ET 
AL., (Calif.) 235 Pac. 2nd 229. 
That assessment work and improvements might be 
made by a lessee i'S not disputed; and so held in NEW 
MERCUR MNG. c·o. vs. SOUTI-I MERCUR MNG. CO., 
supra. 
The evidence also discloses the work done after 
15 
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July 1st, 1949, by Evans and others, and Bray and 1\lor-
gan upon the claims. The work done by Evans \vas done 
before he terminated his lease. According to the testi-
mony 36 shifts of 8 hours were put in by Evans and cre\v 
in July, 1949, p·umping and timbering in the winze, at 
standard n1iners' wages of $10.85 per shift, or $390.00; 
gasoline $98.38; and certainly the timbering n1aterial for 
which there was no figure given, but would run quite 
high, would make up $11.02; making a total of $500.00. 
This evidence is not refuted except by testimony of de-
fendants' that they did not observe evidence of it on July 
20th, 1949, when Sorenson and Spar went out. But an 
examination of their testimony in this case will lend con-
siderable credence to the testimony of plaintiffs' witness-
es 
It is ·significant that Evans, in July, drained the 
winze so he could timber down between the 50 feet and 
70 feet depth in case of future operations; and then the 
latter part of July Morgan and Bray went out and clean-
ed up along the track in tunnel and cleaned out the water 
drain trench. And for this work Bray received credit in 
full for loans theretofore had from Morgan, and was paid 
$30.00. 
·so aside from the carry-over credit of the previous 
year to the assessment year July 1, 1949 to July 1, 1950, 
there was the requird amount of work performed in and 
for the latter year. 
16 
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PoiNTs 3. AND 4. 
The findings and conclusions of the Court are fully 
supported by the evidence and law as to the deed. 
When James Morgan rnade and gave the quit-clairn 
deed to his sons, consideration only one dollar, he wanted 
them to have his holdings, ~lorgan was getting old, and as 
witness Bray stated, Morgan was not a very well man. 
Morgan wanted his sons to have his holdings after his 
death. This conclusion is fully justified by the fact that 
Morgan continue his interest in the claim up until the 
first part of the month he died, November 26, 1949. He 
wanted to see to it that his sons did receive his holdings 
with all the benefits attached thereto; so he made and re-
corded the notice of intention to hold under Public Law 
107, as CO-OWNER. Morgan continued his interest to-
ward work and improvement upon the claims, going upon 
the claim at three different times and contributing his 
efforts-a man of his advanced years and paying out his 
cash. He furnished timber for Evans in July, 1949. No 
court or jury could or would hold that Morgan was a 
stranger or trespasser upon the claims, if such were an 
issue under the state of facts herein. Morgan made and 
filed the notice to hold as co-owner. He was a co--owner 
with the other owners, a co-tenant. He was a claimant, 
as the word is intended to mean as used in Public Law 
107. He had an interest in the claims, and his interest 
was recognized by the sons in withholding the recording 
17 
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of the deed until after his death. Regardless of the testi-
mony of Morgan or his claim it is 1nost evident that 
James ~forgan did intend to retain control and right of 
possession and occupancy of the property after the deed 
was made, for that is what he did, and which negative'S 
the idea that in legal effeet there 'vas co1nplete delivery 
to pass ti tie. 
As to the effect of the delivery of the deed it is stated 
in 18 C. J. 198, after stating the general rule: 
"The question of whether or not there has 
been a delivery must therefore be determined up-
on the facts of each particular case, and although 
certain principle's are generally applicable, they do 
not furnish conclusive rules under all circum-
stances.'' 
Supporting this text is the case of AL W AR·D vs. 
L·OBINGIER, 87 Kan. 106, 108, 123 P. 867, holding that-
"Principles which correctly solve the particu-
lar problem presented are sometimes stated in the 
form of general rules, which do not admit of uni-
versal application." 
And in GAYLORD vs. GAYLORD, 150 N.C. 222,63 
S.E. 1028, it was held: 
"It is a familiar p-rinciple that the question of 
the delivery of a deed or other written instrument 
is very largely dependent on the intent of the par-
ties at the time and is not at all conclusively estab-
lished by the manual or physical passing of the 
deed from the grantor to the grantee." 
18 
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The Court in WEIGAND vs. RUTSCHKE, 253 Ill. 
260, 97 N.E. 641, held: 
"The mere placing of a deed in the hands of 
the grantee does not necessarily constitute a de-
livery. The question is one of intention wh.ether 
the deed was then in tended by the parties to take 
effect according to its terms." 
Incidentally we might quote counsel for defendants 
'vhen the deed was offered in Evidence: 
"MR. ELIASON: Your Honor, I am going 
to object to the receiving of Exhibit 7 on the 
ground that it is invalid, there is no proper gran-
tee shown in the instrument, and of course no wit-
nesses shown on the instrument, and I believe that 
because of two persons named as grantees, with 
the "and" and "or", it doesn't amount to a valid 
instrument, and I am going to object to it. MR. 
F'INLINS·ON: On the further ground that it 
doesn't describe the property in question." (Tr. 
10) 
Even though the deed was and is invalid and that 
there was no complete delivery and transfer of title in-
tended the Morgan plaintiffs succeeded to the interest 
of their father upon his death. 
The case of JUPITER MNG. CO. vs. BODIE MNG. 
CO., supra, was removed from the State Court ( C'ali-
fornia) to the Circuit Court of the United States, where 
it was tried by a jury. Action in trespass-in which de-
fendant pleaded title to the locus inquo. The reports of 
this case seem to set out the instructions given to the 
19· 
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jury, but it has been extensively cited and followed as the 
law. It is said, as applicable to the case at bar: 
"Work done by any of the grantors of defend-
ant while holding the claim, whether holding the 
legal or equitable title, during the performance of 
the labor or work, is available to preserve the 
claim, and no mere relocation for forfeiture, made 
before the forfeiture actually attached by actual 
default, would be valid to defeat the claim." 
And we believe that upon an issue as to the validity of 
the deed between the Morgan sons and the estate of 
James Morgan, deceased, and based upon the competent 
evidence reflected in this case, the Court would hold th'e 
title did not pass from James Morgan, and that cer-
tainly was the view of Eldon A. Eliason when in the affi-
davit for extension of time in which to answer he said: 
"That ·there is no record of conveyance before death 
which would divest these individuals (James T. Morgan 
or F. A. Cromar), their heirs or creditors of interest in 
the mining prop·erty described in the complaint ... " and 
he could find no record of appointment of an adn1inistra-
tor for either of the deceased locators; then proceeded 
to have appointments made and the administrators made 
parties to this. action. 
And thus, the benefit of the extension Act Public 
Law 107 would enure to the successors in interest. 
POINT 5. 
The defendants' locations were attempted in June 
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1951. The issue involved vvas as to work and irnprove-
ments in and for the years J'uly 1, 1948 to July 1, 1949, 
and July 1, 1949 and July 1, 1950. Sufficient work and 
improvements having been performed and creditable for 
such years made the a tte1npted locations of defendants 
premature, ineffective and invalid. 
The n1ateriality of work and improve1nents perforin-
e¢1 after July 1, 1950, would go to the point of refuting 
the allegations of abandon:inen t of the property; and the 
record is clear as to additional work and improvements 
done after that date. 
CONCLUSION 
Surely in a case such as this, when the record reflects 
more than 19 years of effort and expenditures by the 
locators showing the work and i1nprovements upon the 
claims as related in the evidence, and in view of the evi-
dence amply supporting the trial court's findings and 
the conclusions being consistent therewith, now, when 
there appears prospects for reward to the heirs of the lo-
cators, who undoubtedly made sacrifices and contribu-
tions in the course of those years, this Court will, in the 
spirit of the Courts in the past as expressed in the cited 
decisions, affirm the judg1nen t herein; and not reward an 
opportunist who went upon the claims the day before the 
FOURTH of July, 1949, with one, Spar, who knew the 
claimant Morgan and had learned about and locations of 
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the claims and their prosp·ective value, ostensibly for the 
purpose of leasing but never contacting the owners. 
Respectfully sub1nitted, 
P. N. ANDERSON & 
EKSAYN ANDERS·ON 
Attorneys for Respondents 
By (S) P. N. ANDERSON 
One of counsel. 
, ~ I 
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